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Phillips: Phillips: Maternal Rights v. Fetal Rights

Maternal Rights v. Fetal Rights:
Court-Ordered Caesareans
In re A.C.'
According to a recent national survey, from 1981 to 1986 there were
fifteen instances where court orders were sought to authorize caesarean section
interventions against a mother's wishes.2 In thirteen of those instances the
orders were granted In re A.C. is the first published decision in which an
appellate court refused to affirm a trial court's order authorizing a caesarean
section.4 After examining this decision, this Note analyzes the three main
arguments used by courts and commentators who favor the granting of orders
for non-consensual caesareans: abortion law, child neglect law and the state's
interest in third parties. The analysis then turns to the responses made by the
In re A.C. court, and those responses available to the court, but not utilized
in its opinion. Finally, the Note will focus on how Missouri courts might
address the various issues if faced with a caesarean intervention case.
I. FACTS.
Angela C. was first diagnosed with.cancer when she was thirteen years
old.' She married at the age of twenty-seven and soon thereafter became
pregnant. 6 At that time her cancer had been in remission for three years 7 and
1. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
2. Id. at 1243 (citing Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, Court-OrderedObstetrical
Interventions, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1192-93 (1987)). , Court-ordered
caesareans were sought in eleven states: Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee and Texas. The orders
were granted in every state but Maine. Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, supra at 1193.
3. In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1243 (citing Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, supra note
2, at 1192-93). See, e.g., In re Unborn Baby Kenner, No. 79 JN 83 (Colo. Juv. Ct.
Mar. 6, 1979); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274
S.E.2d 457 (1981); In re Baby Jeffries, No. 14004 (Jackson County, Mich. P. Ct. May
24, 1982); North Cent. Bronx Hosp. v. Headley, No. 1992-85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 6,
1986).
4. The only published decision from an appellate court upholding a trial court's
order for a non-consensual caesarean is Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp.
Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981).
5. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1238.
6. d.
.7. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 612 (D.C. 1987), vacated, 539 A.2d 203 (D.C.
1988).
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she "very much wanted the child."" During Angela's twenty-fifth week of
pregnancy, an inoperable tumor was found in her lung. 9 She was admitted
to George Washington University Hospital on June 11, 1987 and her condition
was deemed terminal. 10
I
On June 15, during Angela's twenty-sixth week of pregnancy, she agreed
to medical treatment designed to extend her life past the twenty-eighth week
of pregnancy."' Her physicians believed that the fetus' chances for survival
were much better at twenty-eight weeks than at twenty-six. 2 Throughout the
evening of the 15th, Angela's condition declined rapidly, making it necessary
to perform a caesarean section promptly if the fetus were to have any chance
of survival.' 3
The next morning, June 16, the hospital requested a declaratory judgment
from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia as to whether it should
intervene by caesarean section to save the life of the fetus. 14 The court met
at the hospital that morning, appointing council for Angela and the fetus,
respectively.Y5 The District of Columbia was allowed to intervene for the
fetus as parenspatriae.16 The court heard testimony that at twenty-six and
one half weeks the fetus was viable and that any delay in delivery lessened its
chances of survival.' 7 There was also testimony that Angela was not
competent at that time to consent to the surgery and that the operation might
hasten her death.18 There was "considerable dispute" as to whether Angela
would have consented to a caesarean section on the date of the hearing. 9
The trial court found that it was not clear what Angela's views were
20
"with respect to the issue of whether or not the child should live or die."

8. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1238.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1239. A neonatologist testified that this particular fetus had a fifty to
sixty percent chance of survival and a less than twenty percent chance of substantial
impairment if delivered promptly. Id.
14. In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 612.
15. In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1239.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1239-40.
19. Id. Angela had previously indicated that when the fetus reached the
gestational age of twenty-eight weeks, she would give up her life so the fetus could
survive. There were, however, no discussions about what she would want if the choice
were to present itself before that point in time. In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 613.
20. In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1240.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/8
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The court then determined that, because the fetus was viable, the District of
Columbia had an "important and legitimate" interest in protecting its potential
life. 21 Accordingly, the court ordered a caesarean section.m
Within an hour of the trial court's order, Angela's counsel requested a
stay from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.23 A telephonic hearing
was held before a three-judge motions division.24 The court denied the stay
based on the medical judgment that Angela would not live long and that the
fetus had a chance of survival if delivered by caesarean section.25 Shortly
thereafter, the operation was performed. 26
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals granted a petition for
rehearing en banc.27 In vacating the trial court's order, the highest court of
the District of Columbia held that in virtually all cases when a pregnant
patient with a viable fetus is near death, the caesarean section question is to
be answered by the patient on behalf of herself and the fetus.2 If the patient

21. Id.
22. Id. The court expressly relied upon an earlier superior court decision, In re
Maydun, 114 Daily Wash. L. Rptr. 2233 (D.C. Sup., Ct. July 26, 1986).
Maydun involved a woman whose pregnancy had come to term and whose
abnormally long labor placed the fetus at risk of death or brain damage.
The woman refused her consent for a Caesarean section to be performed.
The Superior Court ordered that the hospital take steps to 'protect the birth
and safety of the fetus,' including a Caesarean section if necessary.
In reA.C., 533 A.2d at 613.
23. Annas, She's Going to Die: The Case ofAngela C., 18 HASTINGS CENTER

REP. 23 (1988).
24. Id.
25. In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 613.
26. In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1241. The baby lived for just a few hours. Angela
died two days later. Id.
27. In re A.C., 539 A.2d 203 (D.C. 1988). The court chose to hear this case,
despite its apparent mootness, for two reasons. The first is that the resolution of the
legal issues might affect a separate action between the parties, in that the personal
representative of Angela's estate has filed a separate action against the hospital, based
upon the events leading up to the trial court's order. The second reason is that what
occurred in this case is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." In reA.C., 573
A.2d at 1241-42.
28. In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1237. Judge Belson, the lone dissenter, believes more
weight should be given to the state's interest in preserving life and the fetus' interest
in survival. Judge Belson advocates the use of a balancing test in cases where a
women is pregnant with a viable fetus. This balancing test would include such factors
as the danger to the mother's physical or mental health, the mother's religious beliefs,
the invasiveness of the treatment, the likelihood of the fetus's survival, the chances of
the fetus entering life with a disability, and most importantly, the fetus's interest in
life. Using this balancing test, Judge Belson concluded that the trial court did not err.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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is not sufficiently competent to make an informed decision, her decision must
be ascertained through a procedure known as substituted judgment."
II. THE INSTANT DECISION
The court laid its foundation by noting that every patient has the right to
accept or refuse medical treatment.30 This right to bodily integrity exists
both under the common law and the Constitution.3 1 The court further
recognized that this right belongs both to competent and incompetent patients
and the quality of a patient's life is not a relevant factor.32
The court then advanced the argument that courts will not compel a
person to accept a significant intrusion upon his or her body to benefit the
health of another person. 33 The court specifically rejected the theory that
fetal cases are somehow different in that since a woman "has chosen to lend
her body to bring [a] child into the world [she] has an enhanced duty to assure
the welfare of the fetus, sufficient ...

to require her to undergo caesarean

'

The court's rationale was that a fetus does not have rights
surgery.
superior to those of a person who is already born. 35
Another rationale advanced by the court is that court-ordered caesareans
erode trust between a pregnant woman and her physician. 6 Without this
element of trust, a patient may fear communication of relevant information
relating to diagnosis and treatment.3 7 In addition, women with a high risk
of experiencing complications during pregnancy or childbirth may shy away

dissenting).
Id. at 1253-59 (Belson, J.,
29. Id. at 1237.
30. Id. at 1247. This court and others, however, have recognized that this right
is not absolute. Id. at 1245-46. See, e.g., In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744 (D.C. 1979); In
re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. 1972).
31. In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1243-45.

32. Id. at 1247.
33. Id. at 1243-44.
34. Id. at 1244.
35. Id.

36. Id. at 1248.
37. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/8
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from the health care system to avoid the possibility of court-ordered
caesareans.?

The court also voiced concern over the time constraints often present in
judicial proceedings such as the one in this case.39 These time constraints

make communication between the pregnant patient and counsel difficult, and
often impossible. 4° They also make it difficult for counsel to organize an
effective defense of the patient's interests in liberty, privacy and bodily
integrity. 4' The court stated that "[a]ny intrusion implicating such basic
values ought not to be lightly undertaken when the mother not only is
precluded from conducting pre-trial discovery ... but also is in no position
to prepare meaningfully for trial. '42 The court recognized that not only is the
patient at a disadvantage, but the judge also is hindered in resolving this legal
dilemma.43
The court concluded that only for "truly extraordinary or compelling
reasons" will a patient's wishes be overridden." The court emphasized that
"such cases will be extremely rare and truly exceptional." 45 The court then
found that extraordinary or compelling reasons did not exist in this case and
Angela's wishes, whatever they may be, should prevail."
Finally, the court prescribed procedures a trial judge should follow when
similar cases arise in the future. The judge must determine whether the
patient is competent to make an informed decision about medical treatment. 47
If the patient is competent and makes a decision, his or her wishes will control

38. Id. For instance, in one case, when the court authorized a nonconsensual
caesarean section, the mother went into hiding. In another, the mother left the hospital
and had delivery at home with the help of a midwife. Both babies were delivered
successfully. Rhoden, Cesareans and Samaritans, 15 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE
118, 123 (1987).
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1248.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

44. Id. at 1247.
45. Id. at 1252.

46. Id. The court did not foreclose the possibility that there may be a scenario
in which a state's compelling interest would override a patient's wishes. The court

refused to decide "whether or in what circumstances, the state's interests 'can ever
prevail over the interests of a pregnant patient." Id. The court, however, added that
"some may doubt that there could ever be a situation extraordinary or compelling

enough to justify a massive intrusion into a person's body, such as a caesarean section,
against that person's will." Id.
47. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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in "virtually all cases."4 If the judge finds that the patient is not capable of
decision, then the court must make a substituted judgment
making an informed
49
patient.
for the

IR. DISCUSSION
Courts overwhelmingly have authorized caesareans over the objections
of the patient. This section examines various rationales used by courts and
commentators to justify intervention. The discussion will then focus on how
In reA.C, responds to the various arguments. Finally, this section will discuss
additional arguments available in the In reA.C. fact situation.
A. Abortion Law
Roe v. Wade 0 has been used by courts to justify orders for nonconsensual caesareans.5" A basic proposition under Roe is that a woman
may elect to have an abortion prior to the viability of her fetus.52 Once a
fetus is viable, however, "the state's interest in potential life becomes
compelling.0 3 At that point the state may prohibit abortion, unless the
woman's life or health is at issue.54 When using Roe to justify a caesarean

48. Id.
49. Id. This means the court, "as surrogate for the incompetent, is to determine
as best it can what choice that individual, if competent, would make with respect to
medical procedures." Id. at 1249 (citing In re Boyd, 403 A.2d 744, 750 (D.C. 1990)),
In summarizing what factors should be considered when determining a patient's
desires, the court stated that

[a] court must consider the totality of the evidence, focusing particularly on
written or oral directions concerning treatment to family, friends, and
health-care professionals. The court should also take into account the
patient's past decisions regarding medical treatment, and attempt to
ascertain from what is known about the.patient's value system, goals, and
desires what the patient would decide if competent.

Id. at 1251.
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
51. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 118-19. See, e.g., In re Unborn Baby Kenner, No.
79 JN 83, slip op. at 6-9 (Colo. Juv. Ct. Mar. 6, 1979); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding
County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 90, 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (1981); North Cent. Bronx
Hosp. v, Headley, No. 1992-85, slip op. at 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 6, 1986).
52. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 119 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64
(1973)).
53. Id. For a discussion of state's interests, see Rush, PrenatalCaretaking:
Limits of State Intervention With and Without Roe, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 55 (1987).
54. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 119 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/8
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section, courts reason that "since states can prohibit the intentional termination
of fetal life after viability, they can likewise protect viable fetuses by
55
preventing vaginal delivery when it will have the same effect as abortion.
The court in In re A.C. specifically stated that "this case is not about
abortion."5 6 Accordingly, the court made no attempt to address the abortion
law rationale used by some courts to justify orders for non-consensual

caesareans. 57 There is an argument, however, that the court may have used.
While the state may, in most instances, constitutionally prohibit abortion
after viability," it does not follow that the state may go further and require
major surgery to promote the life and health of the fetus.59 There is a
fundamental difference between prohibiting abortion and mandating major
surgical intervention.'
In fact, one could argue that court-ordered caesarean sections are
precluded by Roe and subsequent related decisions. 61 Those cases emphasize
that any state interest in the potential life of a fetus must be subordinated to
the health and safety of the pregnant woman; 62 thus, doctors cannot place the
fetus' welfare above the woman's health.6 Physicians cannot be required to
make "trade-offs" between a woman's health and chances of a fetus'
survival.6 If a woman's life or health is threatened at any time during her
pregnancy, including post-viability, she must be allowed to have an abortion.6 In the typical case, a caesarean operation is performed for the sake
of fetal health and not for the woman's welfare.'
In fact, a caesarean

55. Id. See supra note 51.
56. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1245 n.9 (quoting In re A.C., 533 A.2d at 614).
57. See supra note 51.
58. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
59. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 119. See Note, Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding
County HospitalAuthority: Court-OrderedSurgery to Protect the Life of an Unborn

Child, 9 AM J.L & MED 83, 88 (1983).
60. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 119.
61. Id.
62. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 768-69 (1986); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64; c.f Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 485 n.8 (1983).
63. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence ofCourt-Ordered
Cesareans,74 CAUiF. L. REv. 1951, 1989-90 (1986). Cases have emphasized that
health includes a wide range of factors, both physical and psychological. Id. at 1990.

See, e.g., Calautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979); Doe v.Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,
192 (1973); United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971).
64. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 119. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 769; Calautti,
439 U.S. at 400.
65. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 119 (citing Roe, 410 U.S at 163-64).
66. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 121.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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section usually places the woman at greater risk, as the surgery "involves
67
approximately four times the maternal mortality rate of vaginal delivery."
Therefore, under abortion law the state could not mandate caesarean delivery.
This holds true "even in those cases where the fetus' health [is] seriously
threatened by vaginal delivery, because the mother's health will still almost
always be somewhat threatened by surgical delivery. '' 8
In the instant case, there was testimony that the proposed caesarean
section would have had a detrimental effect on the health of Angela; 69
therefore, under Roe she could have ordered her pregnancy terminated at any
time prior to her death.7 ° Certainly, if Angela could have authorized the
termination in order to protect her health, she could also authorize the
continuation of her pregnancy to protect her health.

B. Child Neglect / FetalNeglect
Many are troubled by the thought that a woman could, with impunity,
cause or fail to prevent disabling defects of her child or terminate a viable
fetus, especially when the reasoning of the patient is thought callous or
irrational. 1 Most would agree there is a moral obligation for a woman to act

67. Id. at 119 (citing NATIONAL INST. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., PUB. No. 82-2067, CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH: REPORT OF A
CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE 268 (Oct. 1981) [hereinafter CESAREAN
CHILDBIRTH]). Maternal mortality in general was 9.9/100,000 in 1982, whereas
caesarean section mortality was 40.9/100,000. CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH, supra,at 255;

National Center for Health Statistics, Advance Report of FinalMortality Statistics
1982, 33 MONTHLY VrrAL STATISTICS REP. 6 (No. 9 & Supp. Dec. 20, 1984). Other

reasons why a woman may prefer vaginal delivery over a caesarean section include:
vaginal delivery allows the mother to be a conscious participant during the delivery
process while a caesarean section often leaves women feeling inadequate, guilty, and
disappointed. A caesarean section "may interfere with early bonding between mother
and infant, lead to medical complications and unappealing scars, require subsequent
deliveries to be by cesarean section, and cost more money than vaginal delivery."
Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth,69 VA. L. REv. 405,454 (citing CESAREAN CHILDBIRTH, supra,at 419-26).
For further risks of caesarean delivery, see Rhoden, supra note 63, at 1957-59.
68. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 119.
69. See text accompanying supra note 18.
70. Annas, supra note 23, at 24.
71. Robertson & Schulman, Pregnancy and PrenatalHarm to Offspring: The
Case of Mothers with PKU, HASTINGS CENTER REP. 23 (1987). Although most
women do consent to a necessary caesarean delivery, some refuse due to religious

beliefs, eccentric preferences, individual weighing of values, fear of surgery, or desire
not to have a child. Lieberman, Mazor, Chaim & Cohen, The FetalRight to Live, 53
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/8
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responsibly toward her fetus. 2 Others would go further and create a legal
duty upon the mother to prevent fetal harm.7
Courts and commentators have relied upon child neglect laws in arguing
that a court should override a mother's objections to caesarean delivery when
the life or health of the fetus is at stake.74 Parents are not allowed to refuse
essential medical care for their children.75 Consequently, a pregnant woman
who has chosen to go to term cannot refuse care necessary for the well-being
of her fetus.76 To decline such care is the equivalent of child neglect." If
courts will not allow parents to deny medical care to their child, then they
should not allow a pregnant woman to deny care to her viable fetus. 78
This argument finds support in that virtually all states allow tort claims
for prenatal injuries when a child, who otherwise would have been born
healthy, is born with disabilities. 79 The recent trend toward lifting interfamily tort immunity permits such suits by children against parents who have

caused the child avoidable injury."
The In reA.C. court did not directly address the fetal neglect argument;
however, the court did reject the notion that by going to term a woman has

OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 515 (1979)); Robertson, supra note 67, at 455 (citing
Bowes & Selgestad, Fetal Versus MaternalRights: Medical and Legal Perspectives,
58 OBSTETRICS & GYNECLcOGY 209 (1981).
72. Robertson & Schulman, supra note 71, at 24.
73. See Robertson, supra note 67, at 456-57.
74. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 119-20. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding
County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 88-89, 274 S.E.2d 457, 459-60 (1981); Myers, Abuse
and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State Intervene?, 23 Duo. L. REv. 1, 26-31
(1984); Robertson, The Right to Procreateand In Utero Fetal Therapy, 3 J. LEGAL
MED. 333, 352-53, 357-59 (1982).
75. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 119-120. See, e.g., Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d.
97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952); In re Jensen, 633 P.2d 1302 (Or. Ct. App. 1981).
76. Rhoden, supra note 3.8, at 120. See Robertson, supra note 67, at 443-47.
77. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 120.
78. Id.
79. Johnsen, The CreationofFetalRights: Conflictswith Women's Constitutional
Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE. L.J. 599, 601 (1986)
(citing W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAw OF TORTS § 55, at 368 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]); Robertson & Schulman, supra note 71, at 27.
80. Robertson & Schulman, supra note 71, at 27. See, e.g., Grodin v. Grodin,
102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980). But see Beal, "CanI Sue Mommy?"
An Analysis of a Woman's TortLiabilityfor PrenatalInjures to Her ChildBornAlive,
21 SAN DIEGo L Rv. 325, 326 n.8 (1984). For an account of the abrogation of interfamily tort immunity, see Note, The Child'sRight to "Life,Liberty, and the Pursuitof
Happiness:" Suits by ChildrenAgainstParentsforAbuse, Neglect andAbandonment,
34 RUTGERs L. Rlv. 154 (1981).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1991
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an "enhanced duty to assure the welfare of the fetus, sufficient... to undergo
caesarean surgery.""1 This statement seems to recognize the argument that
fetal neglect and child neglect cannot be equated.
Child neglect is the failure of a parent to perform the legal duties owed
to the child.8' The term "fetal neglect" implies that parents have legally
enforceable duties to fetuses 3 Historically, though, women have not been
held to have legally enforceable duties to fetuses,84 and currently there are
no fetal neglect statutes.85
A child must be treated because parents have a legal obligation to provide
necessary medical care for their children, and treatment does not compromise
the bodily integrity of the parent.8 Children can easily be treated despite
parental objection. 87 Fetuses, however, are a physical part of the mother and
cannot be treated without invading her body. 88 No court would require a
mother to undergo major surgery for the benefit of a born child no matter how
serious the potential consequences of refusal.8 9 There is a basic difference
between ordering medical treatment for a child and compelling a woman to
undergo surgery for the benefit of a fetus. 90 Because of the unique physical
relationship between the mother and her fetus, the simplistic child neglect/fetal
neglect analogy should not be utilized.91

C. State's Interest in Third Parties
In most medical care refusal cases, a court holds that a patient's right to
privacy overrides the state's interest in preserving life, especially if the
patient's life is the only one at stake.92 This remains true even if the result

81. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244 (D.C. 1990).

82. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 120.
83. Id
84. Id
85. Annas, supra note 23, at 24.
86. Id.

87. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 120.
88. Id

89. Annas, supra note 23, at 25.
90. Rhoden, supra note 63, at 1952.
91. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 120.
92. Rhoden, supra note 63, at 1972. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal.
App. 3d 1127, 225 Cal Rptr. 297 (1986); Lane v. Candura, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 377, 376
N.E.2d 1232 (1978); In re Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 529 A.2d 404 (1987); In re
Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785, 156 N.J. Super. 282 (1978); In re Melideo, 88 Misc. 2d
974, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/8
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would mean death. 3 In most of these instances, however, there is no direct
and material effect upon a third party's life or health. 94 Because a mother's
refusal to undergo a caesarean operation has a potentially devastating effect
upon the fetus, courts may recognize that the state has a compelling interest
in preserving the third party's life, which overrides the patient's right to
privacy.95
Courts frequently have acted to safeguard the interests of third parties,
whether to protect them from physical harm or to preserve their emotional

welfare. 96 For example, courts have overridden the refusal by parents of
dependent children, usually Jehovah's Witnesses refusing blood transfusions,
in order to protect the emotional and financial welfare of children.9 Some
courts are willing to override a Jehovah's Witness' refusal even when a fetus
is involved.' If a patient's right to privacy can be overridden to spare a
child emotional or financial loss, then surely it can be overridden to prevent
the child's death or serious injury.9 Courts may be willing to override a
pregnant patient's refusal, acknowledging that, although a caesarean section
involves
some risk to the mother, the benefits to the fetus are quite substantial.' °°
The In reA.C court addressed this argument by noting that a court will
not compel a person to submit to a significant bodily intrusion to benefit the
health of another.'' The court cited McFall v. Shimp,' °2 in which a court
refused to order a defendant to donate bone marrow to save the life of a
cousin." 3 Bone marrow extraction is not major surgery, but it is painful.1°4 The McFall court emphasized there is no legal duty to give aid to

93. Rhoden, supra note 63, at 1972.
94. Id.
95. Id. See Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274
S.E.2d 457 (1981).
96. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 120.
97. 1d. See In re President of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000, 1008 (D.C.
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); Powell v. Columbia Presbyterian
Medical Center, 49 Misc. 2d 215, 267 N.Y.S.2d 450 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1965).
98. See Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d
457 (1981); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421,
201 A.2d 537 (1964); cert. denied, 377 U.S. 985 (1964); In re Jamaica Hosp., 128
Misc. 2d 1006, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985).
99. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 120.
100. Robertson & Schulman, supra note 71, at 35-36. See Robertson, supra note
67, at 456-57.
101. In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1243-44.
102. 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90 (C.P. Allegheny County 1978).
103. Id. at 90.
104. Rhoden, supra note 63, at 1977.
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another, and stated that to require such a duty "would change every concept
and principle upon which our society is founded."'' s The In re A.C. court
concluded that a fetus does not have rights superior to that of a person who
has already been born.' °
In the typical case, a caesarean section will benefit the fetus, but the
mother will be placed at a greater risk. 1'7 Thus the question becomes: Can
a state override a person's treatment refusal and impose a risk upon them in
order to benefit the life or health of another person? 1°8 As the In re A.C.
court indicated,"° the law of rescue is a suitable analogy and provides a
useful model for analysis." 0
Our law imposes no general duty to aid others."' Exceptions to this
rule include special relationships, most important in this analysis that of parent
and child."' Even in instances where "a special relationship gives rise to
a duty to rescue, there is still no duty to undertake risky rescues."113 A
limited number of states have created a statutory duty to rescue, but they
require "only such assistance as can be rendered without danger to the
rescuer."1' 4 To require risky rescues, even by a parent, would mean a
drastic revision of this country's laws." 5 As stated by the McFall court, for
the law to "sink its teeth into the jugular vein or neck of one of its members
and suck from it sustenance for another member, is revolting to our hardwrought concepts of jurisprudence.... Such would raise the spectre of6 the
swastika and the Inquisition, reminiscent of the horrors this portends.""1
As expressed by one commentator, "[o]rdering a cesarean to save the
fetus is just as extraordinary as ordering a parent to donate bone marrow to
save a child.... In each case, a parent is refusing an invasive and somewhat
risky procedure without which his or her child will die or suffer serious

105. McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 91.
106. In re A.C., 573 A.2d at 1244.
107. For a discussion of the risks associated with a caesarean delivery, see supra
text accompanying notes 66:67.
108. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 121.
109. In reA.C., 573 A.2d at 1243-44.
110. Rhoden, supra note 63, at 1952.
111. Rhoden, supra note 38, at 121 (citing PROSSER & KEErON, supra note 79,
at 376-77).
112. Id.See G. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL lAw 612 (1978).
113. Id. (emphasis in original).
114. Rhoden, supra note 63, at 1977 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05.01 (West
Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (1973)).
115. Rhoden, supra note 63, at 1977.

116. McFall, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d at 92 (emphasis in original).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/8

12

1991]

Phillips: Phillips: Maternal Rights v. Fetal Rights
MATERNVAL V. FETAL RIGHTS

harm. '1 7 If a court is not prepared to order a bone marrow donation, and
currently 8they are not, then a court should not be willing to order a caesarean
section."

IV. MISSOURI LAW

To anticipate how a Missouri court would decide a given issue from
another jurisdiction is a difficult task, especially when there is an absence of
case law on the subject. Missouri courts never have heard a case factually

similar to In re A.C.. There are, however, certain statutes and cases we can
look to for guidance. All indications are that Missouri courts would not
hesitate to order a caesarean section against a mother's wishes to protect the

life and health of a viable fetus.
A. Statutes
Any Missouri analysis in the area of fetal rights must begin with two
statutes: Missouri Revised Statute section 188.010,"9 which announces the
"intention of the General Assembly of Missouri to grant the right to life to all
humans, born and unborn," and Missouri Revised Statute section 1.205,120
which states:
1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;
(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health and well-being;
(3) The natural parents of unborn children have protectable interests in the
life, health, and well-being of their unborn child.
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted and
construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of
development, all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other
persons ....
3. As used in this section, the term "unborn children" or "unborn child"
shall include all unborn child or children or the offspring of human beings
from the moment of conception until birth at every stage of biological
development.

117. Rhoden, supra note 63, at 1979.
118. Id. To this date, courts faced with a caesarean intervention question have
not equated the two. Id.
119. Mo. REv.STAT. § 188.010 (1986).
120. Id. § 1.205 (emphasis in original).
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4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of action
against a woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by failing to
properly care for herself or by failing to follow any particular program of
prenatal care.
These two statutes send a clear signal that the legislature intends to
protect fetal life. 121 Yet, the disclaimer found in the fourth paragraph of
section 1.205 muddies the water. These statutes leave questions which must
be addressed by a Missouri court facing a caesarean intervention case.
B. Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Harmon",
There are no cases dealing with caesarean intervention in Missouri.
There are, however, cases which may indicate how a Missouri court would
rule. Cruzan is such a case. Nancy Cruzan was involved in an automobile
accident which left her in a persistent vegetative state."n She was neither
dead nor terminally ill, but would "never interact meaningfully with her
environment again."' 24 Nancy's parents (co-guardians) requested that the
hospital terminate her artificial hydration and nutrition, which were keeping
her alive.' 25 The hospital refused to do so without a court order, so the

Cruzans filed an action for a declaratory judgment.

26

The Missouri Supreme Court ultimately held, for various reasons, that
Nancy's co-guardians did not have authority to order the withdrawal of
hydration and nutrition 27 Some of the rationale used by'the Cruzan court
is applicable to caesarean intervention cases. For instance, the court began its
analysis by looking to see whether there is a constitutional right to refuse
treatment. The court noted that under the Missouri Constitution, there is "no
unfettered right of privacy.., that would support the right of a person to
refuse medical treatment in every case."' 28 The court also found no express

121. For an in-depth discussion of the two statutes, see Special Project, "OfWinks
andNods"-Webster's Uncertain Effect on Current andFutureAbortion Legislation,
55 Mo. L REv. 163 (1990).
122. 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom., Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v.
Director of Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct 2841 (1990).
123. Id. at 410-11.
124. Id. at 411, 422.
125. Id. at 410.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 427.
128. Id. at 417. See State v. Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 513 (Mo. 1986).
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right of privacy under the federal constitution. 1 The court did, however,
find that there is a common law right to refuse medical treatment." 0
The court then pointed out that the common law right to refuse medical
treatment is not absolute."' It must be bailanced against, among other
things, the state's interests in life and protecting innocent third parties. 32

The court then'noted that the state has a very high interest in preserving life
in cases where alife can be saved, as when the patient has a curable
affliction."3 The interest is lower when a life is not at stake, as in the case
where the patient will die despite treatment. 134 The Cruzan court concluded
in the case before it that the right to refuse medical treatment is outweighed
by the state's interest in life. 35
Though factually dissimilar to In re A.C., Cruzan is still a good indicator
of how Missouri courts may view the privacy interests of patents in medical
care refusal cases. Cruzan balances the state's interests with the patient's
interests." s The court seems to view the state's interest in life as being
high, especially when a life can be saved, while taking a narrow view of the
patient's privacy interest. In a caesarean conflict
the court may, as it did in
17
Cruzan, "choose to err on the side of life."
C. Tort Law
In Missouri, a child may bring an action against a tortfeasor for prenatal
injuries, provided that the child is subsequently born alive and the injuries
occurred after viability.'
Parents of a viable fetus may also maintain a
wrongful death action should the fetus expire before birth. 139 At the present
time, Missouri recognizes the parental immunity doctrine. Thus, parents are
not liable to their children in tort for injuries.'
The Missouri Supreme
Court has agreed, however, to hear a case which may abrogate the parental

129. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417.
130. Id. at 416-17. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 497
N.E.2d 626 (1986).
131. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 419.
132. Id
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. IL at 424.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 427.
138. Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953).
139. O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
140. Baker v. Baker, 364 Mo. 453,'263 S.W.2d 29 (1953).
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immunity doctrine."
If the supreme court does abolish parental tort
immunity, then the following argument could be made to a Missouri court:
if the courts are going to allow a child to sue his or her parents for injuries
caused before birth, the court ought to be able to step in and prevent the
injuries. This reasoning, though somewhat tortured, might be used in Missouri
to justify a non-consensual caesarean section.
V. CONCLUSION
Cases such as In re A.C. involve complex legal, moral and ethical
questions, only some of which have been addressed in this Note. No matter
which side a court takes, the resulting decision will be a tragic one. Within
a short amount of time, a judge must make a weighty choice. Should he or
she order a competent woman to undergo major surgery, against her will, for
the benefit of another? Alternatively, should the judge allow the woman to
refuse, with the possible result of a child being born with birth defects or not
at all? An ideal answer does not exist.
Courts must be very careful in dealing with cases such as In re A.C.
The trend toward recognizing fetal rights has resulted in a woman being
placed at odds with her fetus. In the end, a court must chose between a
woman's right to autonomy and privacy and the well-being of her fetus. No
matter which side is taken, the court will be left with an uneasy feeling.
MICHAEL PHILLIPS

141. Sykes v. Sykes, No. WD 42183 (Mo. Ct. App. July 31, 1990).
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